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Introduction  
This paper seeks to derive insight from the rapidly evolving field of hazard mitigation planning to 
the problem of physical security planning for oil and petroleum facilities. While a number of 
different approaches to performing security and risk assessments have been used by the industry, 
none of these singularly or in tandem cohere as a formal physical security process. This paper 
argues that physical security planning for the oil and gas industry belongs inside a business 
planning process and should be an ongoing part of business decision-making. We title this the 
“envisioning the future” model of analysis. 
The problems of terrorism and physical security are akin to those of hazard mitigation planning. 
Conceptually, both result in substantial financial losses as well as a potential for loss of life. They 
also can result in nonstandard impacts, such as the stigma resulting from an oil spill or a 
reappraisal of investment risk due to terrorist attack. A critical component that is different in this 
approach and from the traditional hazard mitigation approach is an underlying belief that it is 
necessary to integrate a wider array of social scientific data, methods, and concepts into the 
planning process than in either traditional physical security planning or hazard mitigation planning. 
This is because petroleum production facilities represent a vital strategic economic and social 
resource. 
The analysis techniques recommended in this paper build on both traditional hazard mitigation 
and on long standing methods developed by industry leaders. For example the “envisioning the 
future” paradigm incorporates the latest techniques from ‘futurist’ researchers to better 
understand how the risk of a ‘worst case’ can be managed, (Burby 1998; Glenn and Gordon 
1999). The possibilistic analysis used herein moves beyond probabilistic analysis typically used 
by quantitative risk analysts (Willis, Morral, Kelly and Medby 2005) and into the much needed 
security arena of identifying and then proactively managing hard to predict risks like those posed 
by terrorism attacks.   
Concept  
As noted, the “envisioning the future” method advocates the development and application of a 
process internal to an organization's business planning process. This method deliberately 
integrates physical security and business planning systems. In many organizations, physical 
security planning is produced outside the mainstream of traditional business planning processes, 
in many cases as a cost of operations not considered a benefit for the organization. 
As a consequence of this disjunction, security plans are not usually tied to business alternatives, 
what would be the optimal integration strategy. In traditional hazard mitigation planning, this 
disjunction is referred to as “the window of opportunity". This window occurs in the aftermath of 
an accident when support by almost everyone for better mitigation planning is at its highest. This 
broad based support enables the organization to obtain funds for mitigation planning. In some 
cases it allows for draconian measures that may be needed to ensure the hazard or threat does 
not occur again. But there are drawbacks with this kind of planning approach. For example, the 
sense of crisis that is generated creates support for this kind of planning, but it also leads to a 
tendency to only plan for the most recent problem. Many organizations wind up planning to fight 
the last war or meet the last threat. They do not fully engage the full range of developing threats; 
they do not envision a future wherein new threats emerge, threats that can profoundly alter the 
business model of the industry. 
An applicable example of this kind of backward looking planning is found in the United States 
airline industry. The physical security procedures developed for the U.S. airline industry and used 
for decades in the industry were in response to isolated hijacking attempts in the 1970s. These 
long standing procedures were not prepared to deal with the threat that developed in the late 
1990’s from terrorism and most vividly manifest in the attacks of 9/11/2001. 
The envisioning the future paradigm argues that it is necessary to incorporate physical security 
and mitigation planning into the business planning process to face these threats. A key part of the 
process is to effectively use futures techniques to identify and define the problem. That is using 
the envisioning techniques to find the threats before they occur, not after. 
To help illustrate this process, scenarios are developed. These scenarios are not just proxies for 
threats; properly constructed they can provide vivid descriptions of future circumstances. They 
can provide specific insight permitting industry managers to prepare for the futures, be it rosy or 
troubling. 
A meta analysis of how scenario planning is typically done shows that the process is driven by 
probabilistic methods that may overlook the motivations of potential aggressors. Motivations like 
religion, vengeance and tribal loyalty are powerful forces that are easy to overlook because they 
are hard to quantify. To help understand this, the paper looks at the history of the oil industry and 
terrorism to help situation knowledge that needs to be known before planning occurs. The history 
of attacks on oil production can reveal some of the past trends, but future threats may come from 
other directions.   
Background: Physical Security of Oil   
When one considers the vulnerability of the oil and gas infrastructure to any form of terrorism 
attacks (Adams 2003; Ness 2006), the most obvious way of visualizing these risks would be from 
a historical perspective. The oil and gas industry has been subjected to attacks over the last 150 
years. This history allows scenario developers the chance to anticipate patterns that may 
reemerge and plan security accordingly.  
From its initial industrialization, the production and refining of oil, as well as the facilities used to 
distribute the final products, have been targeted for violent disruption by a variety of groups. 
Disruption of oil production has occurred for a multiplicity of reasons and through a diversity of 
means, but the trend in these attacks is clear. Oil’s hundred year old place as a critical make it a 
target for human initiated events like terrorism, sabotage, violent political protests and even the 
deliberate attempt to halt the processes of oil location, extraction, refining and delivery (Yergin 
1992; Yetiv 2004; Kalicki and Goldwyn 2005; Perry 2007) 
The first commercial oil well was drilled in Titusville, Pennsylvania (1857). Within six months the 
sleepy Pennsylvania countryside was transformed into a boomtown of prospective oil men 
desperate to acquire a secure flow of the “new light.” Problems arose immediately, as thousands 
of people flocked to the area in and around the oil field. As more and more oil wells were 
discovered, new problems for the burgeoning industry arose—problems with moving the oil from 
the wells to the processing and distribution center in Philadelphia. By 1863, drillers fed up with 
exorbitant drayage fees charged to haul their oil to market began the construction of a pipeline. 
The teamsters who ran the wagon transport operations, who saw their monopoly threatened, 
counterattacked with threats, armed violence, arson and sabotage (Yergin 1992) . The motive of 
the attacks was to ensure continued use of horse transport for the oil. Thus the insider/outsider 
threat was one of the first encountered by the industry. 
The use of “new light” changed the world’s economy and touched off a scramble for oil that 
pushed oil industry explorers into ever more distant corners of the globe. After a series of false 
starts, the Shell Oil Company located a substantial oil field in Sumatra in 1892. Conditions in the 
developing oil field were horrific. Attacks by local pirates against the oil production facilities 
compounded the problems of industrializing such an isolated location. The attacks were distinctly 
low-tech, primarily by means of arson, theft and threats against communications lines. Here the 
outsider threat to extraction of oil was the primary risk.  
In Baku, Southern Russia, labor unrest fermented by communist and local ethnic factions, 
disrupted oil production from 1903-1905. Strikes and armed insurrection against the oil 
companies created the first major disruption of oil productions. The Baku strife began with internal 
labor disputes which had an ethnic component. While labor problems may have originated the 
problem, the ethnic component of the violence rapidly became the locus of the social problem 
faced by the industry and resulted in the slaughter of the many Armenians in the area. His 
struggle was also the training ground for the revolutionaries who would later lead the Russian 
Revolution. One particularly active participant in the violence was Joseph Stalin who credited this 
violence for much of his training. Thus, internal threats to the industry became political threats 
(Yergin 1992) . 
Similarly in Persia 1900-1907, local tribes disrupted oil production by extorting tribute from the oil 
companies trying to develop resources. The production was not seriously disrupted but it did add 
to production costs and reflected the growing trend toward “baksheesh” or bribes paid by oil 
companies to secure their production. This is another type of social/political cost that the oil and 
gas industry would endure in many parts of the world. 
World War I inaugurated the era of oil as a crucial economic and military resource and tied it to 
political machinations for generations to come. The conversion of the British Navy to oil ships 
prior to WWI made the British dependent on oil extracted from Persia in order to operate the 
naval fleet. This pattern was repeated in many countries around the globe. 
The Central Powers also needed oil as fuel for factories and for the vital U-boat campaign against 
shipping. The earliest attempt to disrupt oil production in the war came in 1914. The Turkish Army 
recruited local tribesmen for sporadic attacks on the Abadan Island refinery in Persia. Although 
the force used was small and never completely disrupted production, it did lead to some delay in 
production. This illustrates the vulnerability of the industry to stalling or disruption tactics. 
The First World War also saw two substantial efforts aimed at disrupting petroleum supplies. First 
the Imperial German Navy’s aggressive U-boat campaign from 1917-1918 was aimed at all 
shipping but also substantially disrupted the flow of oil from the United States. Among the 
casualties of the submarine campaign was the world’s first oil tanker, Royal Shell’s Murex vessel. 
Here the threat is form global forces, not just an internal or external threat. This threat is part of 
larger social forces that transcend the industry. 
During this war the British sent a single man “Empire Jack” Colonel John Norton-Griffiths to 
Rumania (1916). He was charged with the task of denying Rumania’s oil supplies to the 
oncoming German Army. In a matter of weeks, Empire Jack had marshaled the voluntary efforts 
of the Rumanian oil workers and burned, bombed, melted and destroyed every piece of the 
region’s oil production capacity (Bridgeland and Morgan 2003). The German Army was able to 
make some headway in restoring production since after five months effort, some level of 
production was restored. The Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Erich Ludendorff acknowledged 
the harm done to the German war effort. At a critical time, the German Air Force was denied fuel 
and the German Army lost the flexibility provided by motor transportation. In a similar fashion the 
vulnerability derives from external social forces. 
After the First World War, the social problem of who owned the profits from the sale of oil became 
more important. Oil had been shown to be a strategic resource that was vital for modern 
economies and war making capacity—thus nation states felt the need to secure this resource for 
industrialization, strategic purposes and for national interests. Problems arose as oil companies 
fought with the governments who owned the land in which the oil was buried. The governments 
needed the companies to extract, refine and distribute the oil, but the companies needed a stable 
political environment in which to do their business. This tension would play out for decades to 
come in various ways around the world. 
In the 1920s the Mexican government failed in this stability task and anarchy broke out in the 
country. The Mexican Revolution disrupted supply as oil companies fought with the Mexican 
government over the rights to the oil. This disruption led to the nationalization of the companies’ 
oil assets and the creation of PEMEX (Santiago 2006). The nationalization of the oil and gas 
industry in Mexico was the first of its kind and effectively terrorized investors from participating in 
the Mexican oil industry for years. This would also be a scenario that played out numerous times 
around the world over the next few decades. 
Oil likewise played a vital strategic role in World War II. Denying access and obtaining access to 
oil supplies was a vital consideration for all sides in this global conflict, regardless of the 
economic interests of those countries or the industry. The war saw four significant campaigns 
against oil production and distribution systems. First was the commencement of the German U-
Boat campaign against Allied shipping. As in WWI, tankers were a favorite target of U-boat 
captains. The Allies sustained horrific losses in freighters in the European theater until 1943 when 
the Allies gained the upper hand against the U-Boats. The U-Boat attacks significantly delayed 
the onset of the cross-channel invasion and possibly extended the war by six months to a year. 
In 1941, there was a replay of the 1918 efforts noted above but this time at Maikop. One of 
Hitler’s major objectives in Operations Barbarossa, the attack on the Soviet Union, was to secure 
the Caucasus oil fields. Hitler made seizure of the oil fields a top strategic priority of the 
Barbarossa offensive and complained that his generals didn’t understand the strategic aspects of 
warfare. The Soviets performed extensive preemptive destruction of the facilities in order to 
prevent the Nazis from using the fields. Despite this, the Germans were able to repair and use 
some of the oil from the region. However, the all-consuming need for oil production drove the 
Germans to reach out to seize Stalingrad, a major industrial city and oil refinery. This ill-fated 
campaign created the circumstances that lead to the destruction of a substantial part of the 
German Army and left the Germans too thinly spread to hold the Caucasus. 
More indirectly, the campaign in North Africa was also an attempt at disrupting and seizing British 
oil supplies. Rommel’s Afrika Korps had as its key target the Suez Canal. Seizure of this canal 
would have disrupted shipments of petroleum from Persia. Had British resistance collapsed and 
the Germans been free to drive into the Middle East at will, they would have opened another front 
and attacked the Caucasus from the south. 
Throughout the war, Hitler was acutely aware of his nation’s dependence on oil. In 1943, the Fifth 
Air Force, on the orders of General Carl Spaatz, shifted its operations away from sporadic attacks 
on industrial facilities to a concentrated effort to destroy Germany’s oil and synthetic fuel 
production. These attacks devastated the German war effort and removed vital supplies of 
synthetic fuel (which was 25% of their fuel by that time). Albert Speer characterized the attacks as 
the worst blow suffered by the Nazis during the war. Evidence of Speer’s perspective is strong 
since by the end of the war, the German Army was relying on foraged oil supplies and German 
fighter jets did not have the fuel to fly (Yergin 1992). 
Meanwhile in the war against Japan, oil was equally critical. A policy of denial of oil to the 
Japanese was implemented in the summer of 1941 and helped persuade the Japanese 
government that seizing oil supplies to the south was key to their national security. The oil 
companies preemptively evacuated some of their families and staff and prepared detailed plans 
for the destruction of the oil fields in advance of Japanese takeovers. 
In Borneo (circa 1942), long-standing plans to deny the oil to the oncoming Japanese Navy were 
implemented. The oil wells were dynamited, materials thrown down the shafts; unrefined oil was 
spilled out of storage tanks and burned in the face of the onrushing Japanese. Although the 
damage was considerable, the Japanese had anticipated this and formed a special corps devoted 
to restoring the oil production as quickly as possible. Oil production was restored after two years 
but the Japanese faced a different problem. They could not securely distribute the oil they 
produced. 
Unlike the U.S. forces in Europe, the U.S. Navy immediately saw the significance of oil production 
in the Pacific war. They began an aggressive and effective submarine campaign against 
Japanese oil shipping. In the Battle of the Marus Sea, the U.S. Navy significantly reduced the 
volume of the oil being shipped to the Japanese mainland. 
The restrictions on Japanese fuel supplies affected the Japanese Navy’s tactical ambitions. For 
example, during the U.S. invasion of the Philippines, the task force with the Japanese battleship 
Yamato was forced to turn back because of its lack of fuel. The use of Kamikaze planes to attack 
U.S. forces who were landing in Okinawa was spurred in great part by the lack of fuel. It was 
possible to load planes with a minimum of fuel and still carry out devastating suicide attacks. Fuel 
shortages made the task harder, but also promoted its use. The whole of WWII was an era 
showing the interrelatedness of oil, politics and strategic advantage. 
Social unrest in Iran flared up in 1951. Fueled by the anti-British Mohammed Mossadegh, mobs 
began appearing in Teheran and the central government was on the verge of collapse. This 
unrest threatened British access to oil and was the direct outgrowth of ongoing pressure on oil 
companies to share greater amounts of their profits with the locals from whose land the oil was 
drawn. In response, under what was termed “Plan Y” the British contemplated seizing or 
sabotaging the oil refinery at Abadan (Time October 8, 1951). This would have effectively cut off 
oil funds to the Iranian government. The response to this threat eventually evolved into a British 
embargo of Iran and was resolved when the Shah of Iran retained his authority. 
In July 1956 Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal and provoked the Suez crisis. Gamel Nasser 
ordered his troops to seize the canal and the Tapline oil pipelines. The Suez Canal’s primary 
value at that point was the shipment of oil from the Mideast to Europe. In response to the seizure, 
Israel, France and Great Britain launched military actions to free the canal and the pipeline. 
These military actions prompted Nasser to disable the canal by sinking ships in the entrances and 
destroying Tapline pumping facilities. This sabotage effort was only briefly successful since it 
interrupted the flow of oil through the Suez Canal, but it also speeded up the trend toward 
supertankers and reduced the Suez Canal’s strategic importance (Yergin 1992) . 
In 1967, during the Six-Day war, the Middle East erupted in strikes, riots, protests and sabotage 
that disrupted oil production (Mansfeld 1999; Sampson 1975). The war reduced production by six 
million barrels a day—over 60 percent of production capacity at the time. More serious than the 
military actions inspiring this loss of production was the oil embargo which followed. This 
collective social protest action caused the United States to open its own internal supplies in order 
to prevent economic disruptions in Europe. In this era oil became a tool of protest and economic 
blackmail. 
The Yom Kippur War (1973) led to a rolling production reduction and embargo which increased 
prices (Toffler 1980; Mansfeld 1999; Chaliand and Blin 2007). It touched off massive economic 
disruptions in the United States and Western Europe. The effective use of the “oil weapon” 
demonstrated that the disruption of oil supplies could be a strategic asymmetrical tactic. 
The Iran-Iraq war in 1980 began with Iraqi attacks on Iran’s oil production facilities. The original 
attacks on the Abadan refinery and oil wells in the western portion of Iran were undertaken by 
Iraqi aircraft and commando squads (Hamilton 1983; Hiro 1991; Alnasrawi 1994). A decade or so 
later (1991) and in response to the impending defeat of his conventional forces, Saddam Hussein 
ordered the implementation of his form of environmental terrorism, a plan to spill and destroy as 
much of Kuwait’s oil as possible (Adams 2003). The first ‘Gulf’ war led to the world’s largest oil 
spill with over six million gallons of crude being released, spilled or burned. The current war in 
Iraq offers new insight into the physical security of oil facilities. 
In summary, history tells us that oil is critical, has been a target and can be used in a wide variety 
of ways. Knowledge of these can inform policy; especially since the old adage “nothing is new” 
applies to the industry. New manifestations of terrorist tactics are better understood as variations 
on themes, some as old as the industry.  
Recent Data on Terrorism Attacks  
The historic lessons told by the incidents noted above are playing out in the contemporary world. 
Oil is a target and the industry needs to be proactive in addressing that threat. Recent trends help 
make this point. In Figure One below the twelve month trend in global oil and gas industry attacks 
is demonstrated.  
Figure One: Global Trends in Oil and Gas Related Terrorism, June 2006 to May 2007 
 
Source: Threat Reduction Limited (2007).  
Detailed analysis of this worldwide terrorism attack data shows both infrastructure related (those 
most obvious to many managers) and personnel risks (many times more obscured). For example, 
during May 2007, twenty-one murders of and twenty-two injuries to oil and gas personnel were 
recorded. Additionally, fifty-one kidnappings of oil and gas personnel transpired worldwide that 
month, with twenty-one being released and thirty still held. 
The Oil and Gas Industry Terrorism Monitor (Threat Reduction Limited 2007) data that is the 
basis of Chart One shows that many regions of the world are experiencing such attacks—in fact 
the following areas around the globe are listed as risk critical—Nigeria, Iraq, Pakistan, India, 
Afghanistan, and the Russian Federation. 
This global phenomenon demonstrates that this is not an isolated threat. Threats from such 
diverse organizations as Nigerian militants, al-Qaeda, Iraqi insurgents, Taliban, Kurdish Workers 
Party, United Liberation Front of Assam and others are of note during this time frame. The data 
suggests that the oil and gas industry faces a worldwide threat and from a variety of motivated 
adversaries.  
In Figure Two the focus is on terrorist attacks that have transpired inside the country of Iraq, one 
of the most volatile social-political environments in which oil and gas companies conduct 
business. These in-country attacks were perpetrated against infrastructure like pipelines and oil 
drilling installations. Once again include attacks against oil related personnel are also noted. The 
data is for the time frame—June 12, 2003 to May 28, 2007. Please note the data is only partial for 
the years 2003 and 2007 since the Iraqi specific terrorism data started being collected in mid-
2003 and data for the full 2007 year is not yet available.  
Figure Two: Iraq Attacks 2003 to 2007  
 
Source: Institute for the Analysis of Global Security (2007)  
The contemporary tactics employed by terrorists in Iraq and elsewhere are illustrative of the risks 
faced by the industry. These include missile attacks that strike oil related facilities, improvised 
explosive device (IED) attacks on pipelines and against highway tankers, explosive formed 
projectiles (EFP) attacks on highway tankers and infrastructure, abductions/kidnappings/killings of 
oil company personnel, railway related attacks and piracy attempts on sea borne vessels. 
The wide range of geographic locations, the various groups of motivated attackers who have 
targeted the oil and gas industry and the variety of tactics they have employed is impressive for 
its diversity. Such data, coupled with the historical risks noted above, calls into question how the 
industry will secure itself, its operations, and its personnel in the face of seemingly mounting 
attention by terrorists towards the oil and gas infrastructure worldwide. 
The data and recent research shows that the threat of terrorism against oil and gas infrastructure 
is critical to understand in order to better mitigate the risks of an attack and the consequences 
that arise after an attack (Makarenko 2003). In order to tackle the task of envisioning the future 
such data must be known and factored into planning. The following section will address the ways 
to organize such data and to plan for the worst case scenarios that should be the basis of safety 
and security operations.   
Human Initiated Events and Worst Case Analysis  
Security professionals typically use one or more techniques to assess the risk of ‘worst case’ 
attacks against oil and gas infrastructure. These include threat assessments, weapon profiles, 
risk analysis, security concepts, security audits, consequence analysis, response planning and 
probable maximum loss studies (PML). These techniques have been adapted from a variety of 
business sources and primarily address the economic consequences of a potential attack. Thus 
they represent the cost-benefit paradigm behind much risk assessment and have a rich history of 
use in this and many industries. They do not necessarily address the need to look at the larger 
social factors behind the attacks and thus miss important contemporary factors that can become 
historical facts inflaming risks, factors that are well illustrated by the delineation of historical 
trends noted above. At the same time these traditional techniques may fail to address emerging 
threats posed by contemporary terrorists and fail to anticipate new tactics that terrorists may use.  
In a similar fashion as the oil and gas industry, safety and security planners in the security 
sensitive nuclear energy sector have used the design basis threat (DBT) methodology to address 
the risks posed by terrorism and sabotage (USNRC 2007; IAEA 2007; Blankenship 2002). This 
method of planning for risks involves the use of a predetermined set of criteria for an attack. 
These may include an estimate of the most likely number of attackers as well as an opinion of the 
most likely potential weapons and tactics they will use in an attack against a nuclear power plant 
(NPP). The benefit of such a ‘straw man’ methodology is that energy related security forces have 
something to plan for, a template from which to train their counter forces and a way to predict the 
seemingly unpredictable. This method does not address the motivation of the attacks, just the 
nuts and bolts of the tactics.  
The DBT method has other serious flaws since it tends to reify what a contemporary threat was 
(at some time in past) and typically it will not change much over time (Ballard 2002a). This then 
fails to update threats for on-going risks and underestimates changes in methods, tactics, and 
motivations of the attackers over time and per social circumstance (Ballard 2002b). For example 
by neglecting the motive for the attacks, the critical distinction between a political attack 
(designed to change social conditions) and a suicide attack (designed to inflict maximum damage) 
will be lost. These two varieties of attacks have very different security responses and require very 
different planning—a critical risk dimension the DBT methodology fails to address.  
Addressing the emerging threats posed by a variety of attacks scenarios, the ‘unknowable’ risk of 
terrorism, and the hard to predict attacks themselves are critical. A critical step is to understand 
the vulnerability of this industry to a variety of terrorist attacks—what we have termed human 
initiated events. The human initiated events include domains of risk—attacks that originate from 
within the organization (insider threats), attacks that originate outside of the organization (external 
threats) and they include external social forces that influence the business environment the 
organization operates within on a daily basis. Insider threats include attacks to secure jobs, to 
gain money or otherwise undermine the security in place in the industry. External threats may 
include attacks meant to garner strategic advantage, attacks that are based on extortion, and/or 
attacks that provide an income stream to a group. Social Forces may seek control over resources, 
seek to gain a strategic advantage over another group or nation, and/or could be based on 
national or ethnic pride.  
Figure Three: Domains of Risk Concern   
 
These three threat domains help envision a future that is different form how threats are perceived. 
They represent risks that can overlap and that are mutually reinforcing. For example, if an 
employee sells critical insider information about security to an outside force, the symbiosis of 
these two domains is greater than any single impact from one domain itself. Put another way, the 
risks for the oil and gas industry rise are considerable in any one of these areas, but with 
interaction between any combinations of these three domains that risk is amplified.  
Figure Three helps visualize these interactions and points attention to the decisive center area—a 
place where all three of the domains overlap. This is the most critical risk area, one that poses the 
maximum possible impact (MPI) area for the organization wishing to mitigate risks to their 
operations. Worst case scenarios and their intellectual equivalent the probable maximum loss 
study, typically focus on one incidence, one critical aspect for the organization, one dimension 
and/or one function of the overall organization. They fail in recognizing the interaction effect of 
such diverse domains and thus they fail in helping to mitigate the risks of future worst case 
threats.  
Human initiated events analysis, coupled with a structured means to develop not just creditable 
but impactful worst case scenarios, are one key to understanding such interactive risks and will 
yield the MPI scenario necessary to plan for the worst case attacks. Human initiated event 
recognition allow an organization to lay the foundation for meaningful and impactful scenario 
development and in the process set the stage for the organization to envision its future prior to 
one of these critical events. It allows the organization to visualize the MPI for the totality of the 
organization or for a specific industrial sector therein, or for the industry as a whole given the 
potential risks contained within the overlapping risks noted. The next section will discuss what is 
needed to set up this foundation and how human initiated event analysis can feed into scenario 
development techniques that can help the industry in articulating scenarios that can better locate, 
define, and mitigate MPI. In other words, it shows how you can envision the future, a future that 
poses the greatest threat to your organization.  
Managing Hard to Predict Risks  
Envisioning the future of terrorist attacks is seen by many in the energy industry, especially the 
more quantitative NPP operators and associated nuclear regulators, as such a low probability 
event that there is no need to develop more robust scenarios (Halstead, Ballard and Dilger 2001). 
We strongly disagree with this assessment. Human initiated event analysis, the actual futurist 
task of identifying the overlapping relevant domains; this analysis requires thought outside of the 
norm. It demands a different paradigm than the one that traditionally dominates such energy 
industry discussions. Such risk blindness is understandable but is no longer tolerable given the 
terrorist imaginations at work. The analyst need just consider three interrelated domains of 
liability—political, social and legal—to understand what is at stake (see Chart Four).    
Figure Four: Liability Pyramid   
 
The oil and gas industry should and does know better than to neglect such liability domains since 
they are subject to terrorist attacks on an almost daily basis (see Figure One and Four above) 
and they are subject to liability concerns in almost every political jurisdiction in the world. Failure 
to recognize these liability related risks in the face of everyday reality of terrorism is a failure of 
imagination, not one of a hypothetical 10 -8 probability calculation. It is recognizing that what is 
needed is MPI (maximum possibility analysis), not the well known and misused probability 
equations that obscure the reality of our changing world threat environment.  
Human initiated event analysis then is the process of recognizing the potential for insider threats, 
outside threats and the triple problem that social forces like extreme political changes and/or 
associated liability risks pose—it is understanding how these interrelated domains can wrought 
risk on the oil and gas industry that is not prepared for multifaceted attacks, has not planned for 
motivated and complex attacks, and has no effective political/liability related cover in the event 
they transpire. 
The potential political fallout, social problems and long term legal liability of underestimating 
terrorism threats is one measure of this risk and where the future will meet the bottom line if such 
planning is not undertaken. That is the greatest justification for integrating management planning 
and security planning—the bottom line will be hurt if this is not done. All of us who work in the 
energy industry can envision that future—but can we envision one where we mitigate those risks?  
The Planning Process   
This paper proposes using a hazard mitigation model for identifying physical security 
requirements for oil and gas facilities. According to Burby (1998), “a mitigation plan is a statement 
of intent. It states aspirations, principles of action, and specific courses of action to achieve those 
aspirations.” It is developed through a systematic process involving a representation of business 
officials, both strategic management and security professionals. Making this type of a plan rests 
on data like that presented above and can serve several purposes. Among these are: 
• The planning process enables the business to consider physical security in a systematic 
and comprehensive manner that can be tied back to business decisions such as budgets, 
human resources needs, etc.  
• The process demonstrates the connection between physical security and proposed 
business policies or programs.  
• The process educates decision-makers and staff inside the organization.  
• The process can serve to coordinate multiple issues, goals, policies and programs within 
the organization.  
• Adopting this approach brings a number of useful, mature methods into use by the 
organization.  
The mitigation planning process includes the following steps: 
• The organization develops the planning intelligence needed to serve as the basis for the 
plan (like that presented above). This intelligence acts as the basis for the plan and 
serves as the foundation for the plan.  
• The organization sets achievable goals and objectives. This describes the plans and 
benchmarks for achieving desired outcomes derived from the first step. For example one 
goal might be target programs/policies for reducing vulnerability. This goal might be 
achieved by increases staff survivability or decreasing the time needed to return to full 
production after an attack—this can be articulated as a desire to increase organizational 
resilience in the wake of an attack.  
• The organization must then adopt goals and policies which lay out the actions required to 
achieve the plans objectives. This step is the road map for accomplishing the second 
step. It acts as the connective tissue between the business plan and the security plan.  
• Finally the organization must conduct longitudinal monitoring, evaluation, and revision. 
This part of the plan establishes how the effectiveness of the plan will be determined, 
how the plan will be executed and implemented. Finally, it describes how the plan will 
adapt to changing circumstances.    
Developing Planning Intelligence  
The critical problem in developing planning intelligence was artfully expressed by former U.S. 
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld in a press briefing in 2002 (Rumsfeld 2002):  
“The challenge for us is that we know there are known known’s. There are things we know we 
know. We also know there are known unknowns. That is to say we know there are some things 
we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns, the ones we don't know we don't know." 
A key problem for decision-makers in envisioning the future is to reduce the size of the unknown 
unknowns. In order to do this, the envisioning the future process advocate the use of futures 
forecasting techniques such as scenario designs and in the process adding relevance to the 
analysis. In performing these analytical techniques, it is necessary to cast the widest possible net 
in receiving input. It is necessary to look outside normal organizational constraints to find and 
assess the effect of the unknown unknowns. 
Figure Five: Scenario Design  
 
In scenario design, the traditional three step process is readily adaptable to the problem of 
physical security planning (see Figure Five above). In the first step, endogenous business factors 
are assessed. Factors here are well within the control of the business or organization assessing 
the threat. In this case, the threats may come from competitors or be business management 
decisions that reflect budgets, time schedules or staffing levels.   
The second step in scenario design becomes more problematic when physical security is 
considered. The normal second step is to examine exogenous variables. That is those things that 
occur outside the scope of the organization. Here traditional scenario approaches identify a 
limited number of variables that may affect the organization yet are not within the organizations 
control. Examples of these kinds of variables are world petroleum demand, religious fervor, or 
social change. It is our opinion that the vast majority of “unknown unknowns” reside in this step of 
the planning process. 
The process of developing planning intelligence for this step is a challenging multifaceted and 
continuous process. Generating inputs to scenario design for this step should include techniques 
normally found in hazard mitigation planning. The hazard assessment is one useful technique. 
The hazard assessment can be undertaken in a variety of different ways with varying degrees of 
specificity. At the least specific level hazard identification locates hazardous areas or areas where 
multiple hazards occur, typically without assessing the probability of the hazard being manifested. 
If the analysis assumes the hazards occur regardless of probability, the hazard identification 
process can be helpful in producing a worst-case scenario. 
An additional level of input is found in the vulnerability assessment. This kind of assessment 
estimates the number of people or business facilities exposed to potential hazards. It provides an 
estimate of the dollar value for a number of people potentially impacted should the hazard the 
manifested. Here again the probability of the hazard manifesting itself is not considered. 
The most detailed kind of hazard assessment is the risk assessment which estimates the 
probable degree of injury and property damage in a given area over a specific time interval 
should the hazard occur. A problem with risk assessments is that they can become tendentious in 
the event of arguments over the probabilities or they can be used as a way to inadvertently 
screening out possible but not likely hazards.   
The final step in scenario design should be an assessment of the current capabilities of the 
organization. It is important to assess how much ability currently exists in the organization and the 
capacity to respond. This will identify areas in which the resilience of the organization in response 
to a physical security problem can be enhanced and the organization becomes more resilient. 
This was demonstrated in World War II to geostrategic level by the development of floating 
reserves that enabled the uninterrupted flow of oil to Allied fighting forces throughout the war. The 
system was resilient and could adapt to different circumstances. 
The challenge of scenario development is how to effectively marshal information and methods. 
These will enable assessments to be performed and help generate analyses that support the 
incorporation of nontraditional methods/data. This then is applied to the various industrial means 
that will be used to find, extract, transport, refine and deliver the oil and gas products to the final 
market. 
The range of origination/extraction points, the multiple modes of transportation necessary to 
service those points, the varied facilities needed to accomplish the processing and subsequent 
transport/transfer of the end products and the delivery of the final product to the end market, all 
need to be assessed as to their common and unique risk factors.   
Conclusion   
This paper suggests that techniques found in traditional hazard mitigation planning processes can 
be useful in designing physical security planning processes for oil and gas production and 
transmission facilities. These facilities have traditionally been subjected to violent disruption and 
attacks. Whether the attacks were directed by organized labor, terrorist organizations, or state 
actors intent on achieving a strategic goal, petroleum facilities have been both vulnerable to 
attack and considered desirable targets. 
Critically important in assessing potential threats to these facilities is the need to undertake a fully 
integrated physical security planning process that works with business planning cycles. These are 
used in conjunction to develop plans that wholly support and reflect the physical security situation. 
To that end physical security planning and mitigation planning must consider factors and 
variables that are geostrategic in nature and fall outside some of the normal objectives of the 
traditional hazard mitigation planning approach. 
To achieve this approach it is necessary to invest heavily in the development of intelligence that 
supports these kinds of plans. This kind of intelligence incorporates scenarios and other futures 
methodologies. There are however unique characteristics found in physical security planning that 
are outside the normal kinds of business future scenarios planning. To fully embrace these plans 
it is necessary to effectively articulate the problem and to search outside normal organizational 
structures to develop effective planning processes for terrorism threats.    
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